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1. Potential Benefits and Risks of a European

MonetarγUnion

1n November 1991 , some 12 years after the installation of the European Exchange-Rate
Mechanism (ERM) , a further step towards monetary integration in Europe was decided
upon in Maastrich t. This has led to an intensive debate among politicians and economists
about the potential benefits and drawbacks of a European Monetary Union (EMU). 1n
Germany, it is first and foremost the "scientific community" , .which doubts the benefits
and emphasizes the risks concerning EMU (see B Aß ELER; et 訓， 1992; BAREIS; et al.,
1992) , while most politicans and managers accentuate the benefits rather than the risks.
1n the other member countries , however , the situation is somewhat differen t.
As a matter of fact , the dispute about how much monetary cooperation and integratiòn in
Europe should be pursued is anything but new. Ever since the ERM was insta l1 ed , it has
frequen t1 y been discussed whether or not it is capable of improving exchange-rate
stability and monetary convergence with a low level of inflation. Corresponding旬， it has
also been disputed whether this system serves as an appropriate preparation for the next
step , the EMU. This paper attempts to provide some answers to these questions. First ,
the most prominent potential benefits of a single European currency are briefly
presented. Then , the ER孔l' s impact in forcing monetary convergence and stability in
Europe is analyzed. The resulting question : Can a further monetary integration in the
direction of a single European currency guarantee macroeconomic stability , both in the
transition to EMU and later on is discussed in the third

pa口 .

Fina l1 y, some remarks on

the importance of fiscal discipline in the EC member states will be made
The Commission of the EC identifies the following m 句 or benefits of a single European
currency (COìv削ISSION， 1990; see also: GRos/THYGESEN, 1991 , pp. 98) :
一

Transactions

costs of intra-community trade and of trade with non-EC-countries

decline , since an increasing share of world trade would be invoiced in the European
Currency Unit (ECU) instead ofUS-$.

Ri sks from exchange rate variability decrease. As long as the share of trade with nonEC-countries invoiced in ECU increases , problems of exchange-rate variability of the
US-$ become irrelevan t.
EC banks will have more comprehensive opportunities. These will arise from the fact
that all activities of Community banks inside EC member states wi I1 be based on one
single currency, which will then be the domestic currency for all European banks
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一

The

European Central Bank (ECB) will reduce its international reserves. Since there

will be no need for exchange-market interventions within the Community,
international reserves could be reduced by approximately 200 billion US-$ .
Furthermore, since more ECU reserves will be held global 旬， seignorage revenues for
the ECB ofsome 0.045 percent ofEC's GDP could be generated
一

Macro-policy

coordination in the Community will improve. Since there will be only

one authority concerned with monetary policy, coordination of stabilization policy
should become easie r. Coordination of monetary and exchange-rate policy worldwide
could also benefit from the EMU, since there will be only the ECB to negotiate with.
As a further po 1i tical benefit , the EMU could serve as a motor for poHtical
integration in Europe , forcing politicans and bureaucrats to cooperate more fully and
develop more efficient decision-making processes.
However , it is not yet clear whether these positive resu 1t s can be realized with the help of
EMU or, if they can , how much of the Community' s welfare could be boosted. Not
surprisingly , sceptics have concentrated on the risks of EMU. 1n Germany , the leading
question is how much macroeconomic stability can be guaranteed by a European Central
Bank. Will such a bank be able to aim its policy on price stability alone , or will it just
compromise between , at least , twelve different points along the Phi l1 ips curve? At the
same time undue transitional shocks are feared in the event of a poorly prepared slip into
the monetary union , similar to the problems following the German monetary union in
1990. The problem of preparation leads us back to ERM , the basis on which EMU w i1l
be set up
2. Did ERM Force Monetary Stability and Convergence in Europe?
ERM has been viewed as a success by its proponents primarily because it has fostered
both higher

monetarγconvergence

and the stability of member states. Both convergence

and stability are important for an EMU for two reasons: First , they are necessary
preconditions for a transition to EMU without undue monetary and real-economy
shocks. Second , to the extend that higher convergence and stability are in fact a resu 1t of
monetary cooperation via ERM , this system can be seen as a proper instrument to
prepare EMU with the help of a gradually intensified monetary cooperation.
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Unfortunately, the successful evolution of ERM since 1987 was interrupted in mid 1992:

Aft er only two years of British , Spanish and Portuguese membership as well as the
introduction of normal 1talian exchange-rate margins , intensive currency speculations and
imbalances forced the community to realign. Moreover, It aly and the UK even left the
mechanism temporarily. An d in August 1993 , the exchange-rate margins have been
extended from 2.25 percent to 15 percent in each direction. Considering the fundamental
data of the respective countries , pa口 of this development should not have surprised
anybody. The British pound entered the ER孔1 with an overvalued exchange rate , and
since then considerable differences in inflation among the ERM-currencies have
undermined the stability of the ERM parity grid . However , the evolving enthusiasm for
European integration following the Single European Act in 1986 sometimes diverted
attention 丘om economic reality . The following section will address the question as to
how far ERM could have forced higher convergence and stability of its member states
2. 1. Major Theoretical Arguments
1n

theo 句，

there are at least three arguments for a stabilizing role of ERM

(S Ì\-伍E芯，

1993): First , as far as those countries which are obliged to purchase foreign currency to
prevent appreciations realize to neutralize the expansion of their monetary base, the
symmetry of interventions ' effects on the monetary base will be undermined in favor of a
bias towards more stability. This is also true to the extend that intra-marginal
interventions within the ER孔1 dominate. 1n this case , as long as the intervening central
bank uses its own foreign exchange reserves or takes on credit from the capital market ,
there is a contractive monetary effect but no corresponding expansive effect in the other
country. Between 1979 and 1990 , approximately 73 percent of the interventions'
expansive effects on the monetary base in Germany could be neutra 1i zed by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. At the same time , more than 88 percent of all exchange-market
interventions were intramarginal interventions. Thus , successful neutralization policies,
as well as intramarginal interventions , have obviously given some asymmetric bias
towards more monetary stabi 1i ty in the ERM-states. 1n the long run , however , different
monetary growth rates , and thus , different inflation rates , cannot be maintained without
either a rea 1i gnment or a convergence of monetary growth.
Second , given that exchange rates are fixed or can only f1 0at within some limits , in f1 ation
leads to a real appreciation , and hence , to a loss in international competitiveness. Given
that political competition works , this puts pressure on politicians to avoid in f1 ation .
Third , even if actual rates of in f1 ation are equal , a higher interest rate will be necessary in
countries which are regarded as less able to maintain price stability. This could result in a
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more restrictive monetary policy in those countries which have relaxed monetary control
in the pas t.
Those effects may have contributed to monetary stability in Europe in the past , with the
Deutsche Mark as the dominating currency (see HERZ!RÖGER, 1992). As monet的
integration proceeds , some ot these effects are likely to decrease in importance , while
others could become even more important (for a public-choice perspective, see: VON
HAGENIFRATIANNI , 1991)

2.2. Empirical Evidence

A tendency towards convergence as well as stability is most striking in the development
of inflation rates (see Table 1). ln 1979 , the average growth rate of consumer prices in
the 8 original ERM-countries (including It aly) was 9 .4 5 percent with a standard
deviation of 4 .26. Both figures rose considerably within the follwing year (13.16 percent
inflation with 6.2 standard deviation) but then dropped steadily to 3.91 percent and 1.4 5,
respectively.
Table 1: Level and Standard Deviation of Inflation in the Original ERM.
Countries*
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Long-term interest rates evolved similarly (see Table 2). In 1979 , the average return on
bonds amounted to 10.87 percent , climbing up to 14.65 percent in 1982. During the
same period , the standard deviation rose from 3.18 to 4 .4 3. Aft er 1982 , however, return
on bonds dropped to 9.3 percent with a standard deviation of only 0.95. While the
smallest and largest return in 1979 was 6.8 and 15 percent , resu 1t ing in a range of 8.2
percentage points , this range narrowed to 3 .4 percentage points in 1991 (from 8.2 to
11.6 percent). According to this data, the ERM obviously brought about some
stabilization as we l1 as a higher convergence within the member states. In fact , since
changes of nominal interest rates are highly correlated to changes in inflation, both
resu 1t s can be attributed to a greater monetary stability in general (see also : BAYOU悶，
1992)
Table 2: Level and Standard Deviation of Long-Term Interest Rates* in the
Original ERM Countries**
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Ireland.
A less clear tendency towards convergence and stability can be observed in the growth of
gross domestic product (GDP). Not surprisingly, overall growth rates of GDP followed
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the well-known cycles of the 80's and early 90's. But the standard deviation of growth
rates has not declined significant1 y since 1979 (see Table 3)
Table 3: Level and Standard Deviation of GDP-Growth in the Original

ERl\ι

Countries*
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Source: Author ' s calculations , based on Eurostat data.

* Germany, France , It aly , Belgium, the Netherlands , Luxembourg , Denmark and lreland .
Table 4 gives the same impression. It shows the symmetry in the European business
cycles as correlation coefficients of the member countries' trend adjusted real GDP
growth-rates. ln the first row of the respective
between first

qua付 er

count 句，

coefficients of the period

of 1979 to the last quarter of 1991 are shown; the second row

presents the period between first

qua口er

of 1987 to last

qua口 er

of 1991. It shows, that

not only are coefficients surprisingly low , but that most even decreased in the latter
period .
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Table 4:

Symmetη，

G

G

of Business Cycles in Europe
FRA

ITA

NEL

BEL

UK

DEN

0.27

0.65

0.70

0.53

0.30

0.36

0.16

-0.01

0.62

0 .4 7

-0.33

0.00

0.51

0.14

0 .4 9

0.50

-0.01

0.79

0.53

0.59

0.61

-0.25

0.25

0.62

0.38

0.12

0.08

0 .4 9

0.85

-0.15

0 .4 7

0.31

0.35

0.96

-0.09

-D.07

0 .4 3

0.31

0.79

0.5-'

FRA

ITA
NEL
BEL

0.29

UK

-0.06

DEN

1979 to 1991 printed in normal type; 1987 to 1991 printed in bold face.

Source: H .-D . SMEETS (1992).
The low convergence in business cycles can partly be explained by the special
development of Germany since the end of 1989 , following the breakdown of the German
Democratic Republic. The potential for an economic slowdown , \vhich could be
observed all over Western Europe , was quickly offset by a surge in demand , sending
Germany into a "reunion boom" , while at the same time France , the UK and other
European countries slipped into a serious recession. Since then , Germany has been hit by
the recession as wel 1. A1 1 in all , even if symmetry in business cycles is still low, there has
obviously been some convergence within ERM, particularly in the case of monetary data
(see also : COtvfMITT凹， 1992 , pp.

17~ KLE肘，

1991)

Unfortunately, the latest events in the European financial markets point in the opposite
direction. Future development will show wether the widening of the exchange-rate
margins are able to fight speculative attacks and to reestab 1i sh stability and convergence
as it has been the case up to 1992.
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3. Will EMU be a Union of Monetary Stability?
3. 1. Fundamental Properties of EMU

According to the DELORS-Plan and the Treaty of Maastricht , the EMU will be set up in
three stages , the first of which was launched on 1 January 1990. This first stage was
intended to foster cooperation between the national central banks. Remaining restrictions
on capital movement will be abolished and all member states of the EC should have been
integrated into the

ER孔1.

The second stage will see the establishment of a European

Currency Institution , the main task of which is to coordinate national monetary policies
and to make the institutional arrangements necessary for the foundation of the European
Central Ban k. This second stage

ofE孔1u

is scheduled to begin on 1 January 1994. Iñ the

third stage of EMU , the ECB is to be founded in order to lay the groundwork for
monetary union. Monetary union wi l1 be realized either by issuing but one single currency
from the beginning of EMU or by the irrevocable fixing of nominal exchange rates
Simultaneously, responsibility for monetary policy wi l1 be shifted from the national
central banks to the ECB . According to the Treaty of Maastricht , stage Two will begin
either in 1997 or in 1999 , depending on the degree of economic convergence and
stability achieved up to 1996
Convergence and stability will be measured with the help of certain criteria. Concerning
monetary policy , a limit on intlation and on long-term interest rates exists: these must not
exceed the respective rates of the three countries with the lowest intlation by more than
1. 5 and 2.0 percentage points , respectively. Additionally , there are two criteria for fiscal

stability and convergence: current budget deficit must not exceed 3 percent of GDP , and
total public debt must not exceed 60 percent of GDP
No later than 31 December 1996, the Council of the EC will decide whether a majority
of member countries have fulfi l1 ed the conditions for joining the EMU and , on this basis ,
whether or not to launch the third stage on January 1997. In order to accomplish this ,
they will have to take into account the convergence criteria. Note that to fulfill the
conditions the member countries will not need to be within the range in every respect ,
since convergence criteria are merely rough and non-binding guide 1i nes. If the Council
decides to launch the third stage as ea r1 y as 1 J anuary 1997 , it will also have to decide if
any member country will remain temporarily outside the EMU. However, this decision is
also not bound to

the 乳11fillment

of convergence criteria. If, on the other hand , the

Council decides not to launch EMU in 1997 , the third stage will automatically come into

a

Aυ

••••

being on 1 January 1999. In this case , no later than 31 December 1998 , the Council wiII
decide again , which countries are ready to join EMU and which are not
3.2. The Meaning of Convergence Criteria

F ew issues in the debate over the EMU have been as heavily disputed as the convergence
criteria. The question arises whether this dispute is as important as it seems to be , since it
is well known that these criteria are not

obligatolγRather，

the extent of permissible

deviation from these criteria seems to be a question of political marketing. Similar1 y,
political power wi lI decide which countries will be permitted to join EMU and which no t.
Whatever the situation might be , it will be simply impossible to exclude e. g. France or
Germany. The same seems to be true for the Nethe r1 ands and Belgium , even thöugh
neither fulfiIIed the fiscal criteria in 1991 and it wiII even be technicaIIy impossible for
Belgium to decrease its public debt from more than 131 percent of GDP to less than 60
percent , by 1997 or by 1999 (see Table 5). It is also questionable whether the criterion of
total pub 1i c debt is relevant at all for the judgement of stability and convergence.
Table 5: Fulfïllment of the Convergence Criteria in 1991
Annual groth rate Current budget
of consumer prices detìcit in percent
ofGDP
10 percent
EMU reference figure
Countrv
Belgium
Denmark
Western Germany
France
Greece
UK

Ireland
It aly

Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain

4.4
3.2
2.4
3.5
3.1
18.9
5.9
3.2
6.4
3.1
3.9
11. 3
5.9

3.0
5.7
1. 7
3.2
1. 7
- 17.9
2.1
2.7
- 10.1
1. 9
3.5
5.4
3.9

Total public debt
in percent of GDP
60.0
13 1. 5
59.6
43 .4
47 .1
85.2
36.7
113.0
103.8
6.9
79.8
6.+ .7
45.3

Return on bonds in
percent

9.3
9.3
8.5
9.0
23.3
10.1
13.0
13.0
8.1
8.7
17.1
12 .4

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1992) , P 8
At this point in the discussion it seems useful to distinguish between convergence and
stability. If we agree in principal that an appropriate institutional setting of ECB is the
only guarantee for long-term monetary stability and that it is the very task of
convergence prior to the third stage to avoid undue shocks in the transition to EMU, we
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should avoid confusing the two concepts. That is to say , convergence criteria should not
be used to evaluate future macroeconomic stability but only to measure the present
tendency of convergence. As long as the inflation rates and interest rates of potential
member countries are in a narrow range , and as long as reasonable exchange rates
according to purchasing power have been maintained for some time , monetary
adjustment shocks are unlikely , even if inflation prior to transition averaged 1 percent or
5 percen t. On the other hand , there is no guarantee that inflation w i1l remain low if the
ECB is improperly constructed , even if it were zero prior to transition.
In addition to monetary imbalances , fiscal imbalances will be without doubt a source of
future macroeconomic instability. But here , it is current budget deficit rather than total
public debt which should be observed carefully. True , fiscal imbalances are not a dírect
source of inflation , so that it might be argued that monetary stabi 1i ty may well be
maintained as long as ECB is strong enough to reject any quests for monetary expansion
But even if ECB is given a high degree of autonomy , pressure from outside might
become too great to resist , as has frequently been the case with the relatively
autonomous Deutsche Bundesbank

(HAMACHE RlKLE肘，

1993 ~ SARGENTIW ALLACE ,

1981). Moreover , large budget deficits could push up European interest rates and cause

a recession if ECB does not ease money supply. Finally , with a single monetary authority
in Europe there \vill be no chance for the member states to inflate away public debts
Thus , as long as no further credits can be taken on , the only remaining source of pub 1i c
revenue will be taxes , which cannot be increased infinitely without eroding the tax base.
Therefore , even though the Treaty

of 孔1aastricht

contains a "no bail-out clause" , political

pressure caused by insolvency in one of the countries or by economic pressure from
macroeconomic spillovers arising from the debt problem of some countries could lead to
violations , or even a de facto

abolishm 訓，

of the non bail-out clause

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis:
Concerning the threat of monetary shocks in the transition period , the convergence
criteria seem to be adequate guides to the respective countries' monetary situation ,
since they provide information about convergence in inflation rates , interests rates ,
and a longer period of exchange-rate stability. Somewhat less satisfactory is the nonobligatory character of the underlying criteria as well as some imprecise formulations
with respect to exchange-rate stability.
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By contrast , for assessing long-term monetary stability, convergence criteria appear
to be inappropriate. Here , the institutional setting of ECB should be analyzed ,
because this will be the future source of inflation or of stability.
一

Current

deficit gives some insight into the fiscal stability of a country, while total

public debt does no t. But since fiscal stability is of special importance for the stability
of EMU, measuring current deficit is not enough. The future structure of fiscal
authorities , as well as their opportunities to acquire revenues or to spill over costs of
unsound fiscal policy to other member countries , will be the most important aspects
of a future E!\征J.
3.3. The Importance of the European Central Bank' s Constitution

At least formally , the ECB is basically a copy of the Deutsche Bundesbank (see KENEN,
1992 , pp. 17). Not even the strongest opponents of EMU deny tha t. As with the
Bundesbank , the Council of the ECB consists of an executive board together with the
president and the vice president of the ECB and four additional members; the governing
council is made up of the governors of the National Central Banks and the members of
the executive board. The governing council is obliged to adopt guidelines and take the
necessary decisions to ensure a stable European currency. The executive board is
required to implement monetary policy according to the guidelines and decisions of the
governing council . The members of the executive board are to be appointed by the heads
of state or government for eight years
The ECB will be independent in the sense that neither the ECB itself nor one of the
national central banks is obliged , or even permitted , to carry out any order from the
institutions of the EC or those of one of the member states. Furthermore , any kind of
credit facility given to the Community itself or to one of its member states is strictly
prohibited
Even though the ECB closely resembles the constitution of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
and independence in some respects is formally even more strictly guaranteed , some
authors doubt the material independence of the ECB members. As is the case with the
Deutsche Bundesbank , the members of the executive board will be appointed by the
heads of the governments or states. But the Deutsche Bundesbank deals with only one
government , and this government only suggests the members , while it is the more
independent president of the F ederal Republic who appoints the members in the end
Finally , the governors of the N ational Central Banks , all of whom will be members of the
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governing council , are appointed according to different rules in the respective member
countries alone. True , before the third stage of the EMU will be launched , all European
central banks wi lI have been given independence. But this could be realized only one day
before , so that a new National Central Bank' s governor might be elected right before the
EMU comes into being , join the governing council and act only according to the wishes
of his national governmen t.
Critics of EMU focus on the higher degree of "federalism" inside ECB and on the
possibly higher degree of material dependence of the governing counci l' s members on
their respective governments. ln fact , they are not against federalism in European
monetary policy , but against federalism within a centralistic institution. Combining both
arguments , they fear the following : Given that each member of the governing council- will
represent his own country' s interest , and given that each

countrγwill

have its own

"in f1 ation mentality" , i. e. each country will prefer one specific combination of in f1 ation
and unemployment along the Phillips-curve menu , the result can never be monetary
stability. Aft er being compromised between the different preferences , there will be no
price stability but more or less an average of the in f1 ation rates that existed prior to
(see e. g. BERTHOLD , 1992 , pp . 178;

G旭TS C恥以NN ，

1991 , pp . 703 ;

SIEBEI汀，

E孔1u

1992 ,

p .4 2) . But what is more , as federalism along with the degree of different preferences
inside ECB rise , compromising between different preferences will become more difficult ,
and thus could lead to more complicated decision-making processes
To be sure , we do not agree with this position. This is so for mainly three reasons:
Even though it initially seems obvious , the existence of different "in f1 ation
mentalities" is in doub t. There is no reason to depart from our fruitful economic
assumption that people act according to existing circumstances , institutional
structures , incentives and disincentives rather than to

dubious 叮nentalities".

Germany

has experienced two destructive in f1 ations in this century and a high degree of
macroeconomic instability in the interim. Only since the institutional structure of an
independent central bank has been in existence , a certain degree of long-term
monetary stability has been maintained . There is simply no reason to believe that
monetary stability in the FRG has to do with anything other than an appropriate
institutional structure
一

The

history of the Bundesbank teaches that whatever the political origins and former

dependencies of the respective members might have been , and \Nhatever region they
came from , be it a region hit by high structural problems and unemployment or a
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prospering one with low unemployment , there have never been significant differences
in their behavior as members of the governing council or even of the executive board
Be it M r. Pöhl from the Social Democrats

or 孔1r.

Schlesinger from the Christian

Democrats , there has been no significant difference in monetary policy
It is true that right before the ECB starts its work , some countries might appoint

some loyal governors , hoping that they will represent their political interes t. But this
can only be a temporary phenomenon , since after a while governors wiII be reelected
according to new rules. Furthermore , after election the governors of the National
Central Banks wiII remain on their jobs for at least 5 years , no matter which kind of
policy they actuaIIy pursue.
To conclude , from a more conservative viewpoint one might opt against EMU, since due
to constitutional ignorance (HA YEK) we cannot make precise and reliable predictions
about how the institutional structure ofECB wiII wor k. On the other hand , analyzing this
structure gives little reason to believe that ECB wiII do worse than the Deutsche
Bundesban k. However, this is not to say that this structure is the best we can think
abou t. On the contrary, the Deutsche Bundesbank and its monetary policy can be
criticized severely. EspeciaIIy the meaning of formal independence in the absence of an
explicit objective function of the actors of monetary policy is discussed intensively. 1n
order to improve monetary performance in an EMU compared to the German one and
reduce the risks of EMU stemming from constitutional ignorance , it therefore seems
helpful to search for better arrangements , ones which include explicit incentives for the
monetary-policy makers.
4. The Role of Fiscal Policy

To accept that the institutional structure ofECB and Deutsche Bundesbank do not differ
considerably is one thing. But from this alone it does not foIIow that EMU wiII produce
macroeconomic stability. As noted above , even the Deutsche Bundesbank has not been
completely immune to quests for a more expansive policy to combat an economic
slowdown. This could also be true for the ECB and , moreover , the underlying problems
might be EMU-specific. The crucial question here is whether the decision-making
process concerning fiscal policy of the EMU-members can be trusted or if some reform is
necessary prior to EMU. On this point , according to earlier views from the theory of
fiscal federalism (OA TES , 1968) some caII for a greater degree of centralization in order
to force stability in the member countries , while others argue for fiscal competition
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among the European states (I SSING, 1993 , pp. 158). However, in every case the question
is whether a bail out of budget debts can be strictly excluded
The underlying problems cannot be discussed in detail here , but some should at least be
mentioned because of the negative experience with the German monetary union. The
sudden integration of two regions induced a strong tendency towards rising wages in the
economically weaker region. This in turn caused massive unemployment and an
unprecedented demand for transfers

(AKE也OF~

et al., 1991). Moreover , to enforce fiscal

discipline , rapid reunification , and thus , political centralization , became indispensable.
Even though the situation concerning wage negotiations , factor mobility and the
autonomy of governments in the EC is significantly different from that in the two
German regions , those experiences should nevertheless be taken seriously. There will
undoubtly be some tendency to equal wages following the EMU, and there wiII alsb be
some enhancement of factor mobility. Simultaneously, calls for a harmonization of social
insurance-systems wi I1 become stronger and can hardly be ignored
A1 1 this could strain the fiscal capacity of the poorer countries. Together with an

incentive to spill over domestic fiscal problems via greater budget deficits , which raises
interest rates and crowds out private investments in the whole union or via direct
transfers , the threat of fiscal instability seems to be the most serious risk ofEMU
Therefore , those questions should be given much more attention than convergence
criteria or the construction of the ECB. Here , future investigations and , more
importantly , the search for proper institutional arrangements should be the focus in order
to avoid problems similar to those that have occurred in Germany (see also: GÄCKLE ,
1992~ KE悶N，

1992 , pp. 68)
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